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INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, the federal government has maintained
the position that the care of individuals with mental illness is a bur-
den of the states, not of the federal government.' This position has
been strengthened through the recent scrutiny of Institutions for
t The author is grateful to her mother, Helen Jennen, owner/administrator of
Hayes Residence (a local NF/IMD), for providing valuable information and dialogue
on this topic. The author would also like to acknowledge her deceased great-aunt
Mildred Hayes for founding Hayes Residence and dedicating most of her life to
providing shelter and care for individuals with mental and physical impairments.
Finally, the author would like to thank the residents of Hayes Residence for their
exuberance and continued friendship.
1. See, e.g., Legion v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 456, 459 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub
nom. Legion v. Weinberger, 414 U.S. 1058 (1973) (upholding the exclusion of state
mental hospitals from Medicare and Medicaid benefits under the Social Security Act
of 1935 because the "care of the mentally ill in state hospitals was the responsibility
of the states .... ").
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Mental Diseases (IMDs),2 and the denial of funding for the services
provided in IMDs under the federal Medicaid Program.3
This article will examine the IMD exclusion under the Medicaid
Program, which prohibits the expenditure of federal dollars for the
care of non-elderly, mentally ill adults in IMDs.4 Emphasis will be
placed on the discriminatory nature of the IMD exclusion, and on the
recent impact this exclusion has had on mentally ill individuals in
Minnesota. The article will also explain some of the complicated lan-
guage, history, and litigation surrounding these provisions, and will
outline three different arguments against the current application of
the IMD classification. Finally, this article will advocate amending
the Medicaid Program to repeal or, in the alternative, modify the
IMD exclusion to provide equal treatment and funding for the men-
tally ill under the Social Security Act.
I. BACKGROUND
This section provides background information on the Medicaid
Program. Additionally, this section lays the groundwork for under-
standing the IMD exclusion by explaining the levels of care and the
types of long-term health care facilities that are covered under the
Medicaid Program.
A. Medicaid Program
The Medicaid Program (which is often referred to at the state level
as Medical Assistance) under the Social Security Act is a federal
assistance program for "aged, blind, and disabled individuals, whose
income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary
medical, . . .rehabilitative, and other [services]."5 This program
provides grants to participating states to help cover medical ex-
penses for qualifying individuals. 6 By setting out a "state plan," par-
2. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (discussion of a recent federal
audit of IMDs).
3. See infra note 33.
4. Id.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988). For a simplified explanation of the Medicaid Pro-
gram, see Medicaid in Minnesota: How It Stacks Up, Saint Paul Pioneer Press, July 15,
1990, at IG, col. 3 [hereinafter Medicaid in Minnesota]. Medicaid is the main govern-
ment health care program "for the poor and disabled," and should not be confused
with the Medicare Program. Medicare is a federal insurance program to cover hospi-
talization and doctors' charges, supplemented by monthly premiums paid by the ben-
eficiaries who desire coverage. Id. For a more detailed comparison of Medicaid and
Medicare, see Legion, 354 F. Supp. at 458.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1988). See also Medicaid in Minnesota, supra note 5, at IG,
col. 2. The percentage of state contributions changes from year to year. In Minne-
sota in 1990, the federal government share was 54%, the state share was 41.4%, and
the county share was 4.6%. Id.
[Vol. 17
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ticipating states are allowed to determine, to a certain degree,
eligibility requirements and services to be provided. 7 While the
Medicaid Program broadly covers many medical services, this article
will focus on Medicaid coverage of institutional long-term care8 for
disabled individuals.9
A "disabled individual," under the Medicaid Program, is defined
as an individual who is "unable to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than twelve months."' 0 The statute further defines a "physical or
mental impairment" as "an impairment that results from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstra-
ble by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques."I I
The following section explains the various levels of institutional
long-term care and the types of facilities that provide such care as
defined under the Program. A brief history will be provided to show
how the levels of institutional long-term care have changed over the
past twenty-five years, as several of the cases discussed later in the
article will refer to classifications that are no longer used.
B. Long-Term Care Under the Medicaid Program
As originally enacted in 1965, the Medicaid Program only author-
ized reimbursement for a single level of institutional long-term
care.12 This level of care was called "skilled nursing home care,"' 3
and was created to provide a lower level of care than that provided in
hospitals.
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1988). A state plan is a contract with the federal gov-
ernment explaining how the state will administer the federal funds. Although the
state plan must comport with federal requirements, the statute allows for variations
from state to state. For example, each state may determine income and resource
limitations for its state plan. Id.
8. The term "institutional long-term care" is used in this article as a general
term to refer to the care provided in the long-term care facilities as provided in 42
U.S.C. § 1396d (1988) (definition of long-term care coverage under the Medicaid
Program).
9. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396d (1988) (appropriations for the Medicaid Pro-
gram and description of disabled persons who qualify).
10. Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). See also Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 223-24
(1981) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A)).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C) (1988).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(28) (1970); Edelman, Level of Care for Medicaid Nursing
Homes to be Eliminated by October 1, 1990: What Lies Ahead, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 959,
959 (1989) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 13961(a)(28) as authority for authorized reimburse-
ment for the single level of institutional long-term care) [hereinafter Level of Care].
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4) (1965).
19911
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In 1971, Congress created a second level of care under the Medi-
caid Program, called "intermediate care." This level of care fell be-
low skilled nursing home care, but above the level of care provided
in boarding homes. 14 This intermediate level of care was intended
to enable states "to use lower cost facilities more appropriate to the
needs of thousands of persons, thus avoiding the higher charges for
skilled nursing homes when care of that kind [was] not needed."' 5
Facilities under the Medicaid Program that provided the intermedi-
ate level of care were called "Intermediate Care Facilities" (ICFs).16
The most recent statutory definition of an ICF (prior to the
changes effective October 1, 1990) was
an institution which.., is licensed under State law to provide, on a
regular basis, health-related care and services to individuals who
do not require the degree of care and treatment which a hospital or
skilled nursing facility is designed to provide, but who because of
their mental or physical condition require care and services (above
the level of room and board) which can be made available to them
only through institutional facilities .... 17
Federal regulations defined a resident of an intermediate care facility
as "an individual who is ... [iun need of and receiving professional
services to maintain, improve, or protect health or lessen disability
or pain under the direction of a practitioner of the healing arts [and
is] . . . [u]nder care and supervision 24 hours a day."' 18
Facilities which provide nursing home care were called "Skilled
Nursing Facilities" (SNFs). An SNF was also defined (prior to Octo-
ber 1, 1990) under the Medicaid Program as a facility that provides
14. See Level of Care, supra note 12, at 960 (In creating intermediate level of care,
the intent of Congress was to reduce the number of qualified Medicaid recipients
relying on the more costly SNF care.).
15. S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2834, 3013. See also Level of Care, supra note 12, at 960.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (Supp. V 1981) (as amended). The provision defining
ICFs was added in 1971. See Pub. L. No. 92-223, § 4(a)(2), 85 Stat. 802, 809 (1971).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
18. Health Care Financing Administration, 42 C.F.R. § 435.1009 (1989). The
definition provides:
Resident of an intermediate care facility is an individual who is-
(a) In need of and receiving professional services to maintain, improve,
or protect health or lessen disability or pain under the direction of a
practitioner of the healing arts;
(b) Admitted to an intermediate care facility in accordance with
§§ 450.370 through 450.381 of this subchapter, or receiving ICF serv-
ices in a hospital with a swing-bed approval in accordance with
§ 447.280 of this chapter;
(c) Under care and supervision 24 hours a day; and
(d) If he or she is in an institution for the mentally retarded, receiving
active treatment as defined in this section.
[Vol. 17
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inpatient, skilled nursing or rehabilitative servicesl9 on a higher level
than an ICF.20
Effective October 1, 1990, the Medicaid Program was amended to
create a single classification, "Nursing Facility" (NF), to provide both
ICF and SNF services.21 Additionally, the ICF and SNF classifica-
tions were eliminated.22 The new NF classification combines the
levels of care previously provided under both the old SNF classifica-
tion2S and the old ICF classification.24 Since the new NF classifica-
tion requires facilities to provide both levels of care to participate in
the Medicaid Program, the old ICFs must now meet the new, higher
requirements to operate as an NF.25
The October 1990 amendment, creating a single level of care
(NF), resulted from a perceived ineffectiveness of the prior two levels
of care (ICF and SNF), and has been both criticized and supported.
Supporters of the amendment criticize the old system because of its
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(a) (1988).
In this subchapter, the term "skilled nursing facility" means an institution
(or a distinct part of an institution) which-
(1) is primarily engaged in providing to residents-
(A) skilled nursing care and related services for residents who require
medical or nursing care, or
(B) rehabilitation services for the rehabilitation of injured, disabled, or
sick persons,
and is not primarily for the care and treatment of mental diseases ....
Id.
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(c) (Supp. V 1981).
21. A Nursing Facility is defined as
an institution ... which-
(1) is primarily engaged in providing to residents-
(A) skilled nursing care and related services for residents who require
medical or nursing care,
(B) rehabilitation services for the rehabilitation of injured, disabled, or
sick persons, or
(C) on a regular basis, health-related care and services to individuals
who because of their mental or physical condition require care and
services (above the level of room and board) which can be made avail-
able to them only through institutional facilities,
and is not primarily for the care and treatment of mental diseases ....
42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a) (1988); see also Level of Care, supra note 12, at 959.
22. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(c), (i) (1988) (no longer containing definitions for
ICF or SNF); see also Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-
203, § 4211(e), 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 1330, 1330-204,
1330-205 (striking the ICF and SNF definitions).
23. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a) (1988) with 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(a) (1988); see
also supra notes 19 and 21.
24. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a)(l)(C) (1988) with 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(c)(1)
(Supp. V 1981).
25. The requirements do, however, allow for some flexibility. Facilities may ob-
tain a specific "waiver" to waive additional nurse staffing requirements. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396r(b)(4)(C) (1988) (as amended). This waiver was made available after Con-
gress recognized that some facilities may have trouble finding sufficient numbers of
licensed nurses (RNs and LPNs). See Level of Care, supra note 12, at 963.
1991l
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claimed " 'inability ... to properly match resources with patient care
needs.' "26 The old system was also criticized because the United
States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had
trouble controlling how the different states assigned the ICF and
SNF classifications to the long-term care facilities in the state. Varied
interpretations on the state level of the ICF and SNF classifications
resulted in a vast difference in the numbers of ICFs and SNFs from
state to state. 27 Additionally, supporters of the amendment believe
that the new system will provide more flexibility, and that an individ-
ual's choice of facilities will not be restricted by the ICF and SNF
levels of care because NF facilities will satisfy both levels of needs.28
Those who criticize the amendment anticipate an increase in some
states' Medicaid budgets. 2 9 States with a large number of ICFs will
see an increase in their Medicaid budgets because the old ICF facili-
ties will now bill at the higher NF rates to account for the stepped-up
level of care requirements.30
II. THE IMD EXCLUSION
A. Definition and Application of the IMD Exclusion
In addition to the above-mentioned classifications for long-term
care facilities, i.e., ICF, SNF, and the new NF classification, the Medi-
caid Program also created a classification for Institutions for Mental
Diseases (IMD).3' This article's primary focus is on the IMD classifi-
cation and how the classification relates to the previously-mentioned
level of care classifications.
Unlike the other classifications, IMD is used only for the purposes
26. Id. at 962 (quoting Fries, A Patient Classification System for Long-Term Care: Execu-
tive Summary, Health Care Financing Administration, GRANrs AND CoNrR.ACTS REP. 3 (Aug.
1984)).
27. In 1985, Texas had 770 ICFs, while Arizona had none. The District of Co-
lumbia had three SNFs, while California had 1,148. See id. at 961.
28. See, e.g., id. at 962-63 (explaining the change in the respective levels of care
and the effect of the change in forcing facilities to retrofit to meet the higher
standard).
29. See id. at 963. One such group is the Institute of Medicine. Id.
30. Id. at 964. The billing rates are controlled in some states by reimbursement
systems that pay different amounts for different patients, depending upon the indi-
viduals' care needs. For more information on Medicaid reimbursement systems, see
generally id.
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(i) (1988). "The term 'institution for mental diseases'
means a hospital, nursing facility, or other institution of more than 16 beds, that is
primarily engaged in providing diagnosis, treatment, or care of persons with mental
diseases, including medical attention, nursing care, and related services." Id. This
definition was added in 1988. See Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub.
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of excluding certain individuals from Medicaid eligibility.32 The
IMD exclusion specifically prohibits an otherwise eligible person
from receiving Medicaid if that individual is between the ages of
twenty-one and sixty-four years old and resides in a long-term care
facility that is classified as an IMD.33
Due to the exclusionary nature of the IMD provisions, the IMD
exclusion stands apart from all other Medicaid provisions. 34 The
only similar provision within the Medicaid Program is the repealed
provision that similarly targeted and excluded individuals within in-
stitutions for tuberculosis.35
32. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (1988) (clauses which limit application of
Medical Assistance to IMDs are found in subsections 1, 4(A), 14, 15, 16).
33. The statutory Medicaid provisions include the following coverage:
payment of part or all of the cost of the following care and services... for
individuals .. .who are-
(i) under the age of 21....
(iii) 65 years of age or older,
(v) 18 years of age or older and permanently and totally disabled....
(vii) blind or disabled as defined in section 1382c of this title, ...
but whose income and resources are insufficient to meet all of such cost
[of]-
(1) inpatient hospital services (other than services in an institution for mental
diseases);
(4)(A) nursing facility services (other than services in an institution for mental
diseases) for individuals 21 years of age or older...
(13) other diagnostic, screening, preventive, and rehabilitative services;
(14) inpatient hospital services and nursing facility services for individ-
uals 65 years of age or over in an institution for mental diseases;
(15) services in an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded
(other than in an institution for mental diseases) for individuals who are deter-
mined, in accordance with section 1396a(a)(31)(A) of this title, to be in
need of such care;
(21) any other medical care, and any other type of remedial care recog-
nized under State law, specified by the Secretary;
except as otherwise provided in paragraph (16), such term does not include-
(A) any such payments with respect to care or services for any individual
who is an inmate of a public institution (except as a patient in a medical
institution); or
(B) any such payments with respect to care or services for any individual
who has not attained 65 years of age and who is a patient in an institution for
mental diseases.
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (1988) (emphasis added). These repeated exclusions for indi-
viduals in IMDs are referred to in this article as the "IMD exclusion."
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(A) (Supp. IV 1970). The tuberculosis exclu-
sion was discontinued by amendment in 1984. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,
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Examples may assist in understanding the unusual results of the
IMD exclusion. If an individual twenty-one through sixty-four years
of age resides in an IMD, that individual is excluded from benefits
under the Medicaid Program.3 6 If that same individual moves from
the IMD to a non-IMD facility, that person would no longer be ex-
cluded from the Medicaid Program. At the same time, an individual
under twenty-one or over sixty-four years of age, residing in an IMD,
is not excluded from Medicaid Program benefits.37
One major problem with the IMD exclusion is the definition of
Institutions for Mental Diseases. Even though the IMD exclusion
dates back to 1965, the term "IMD" was not statutorily defined until
1988.38 After many years of controversy, Congress finally defined
the term to mean "a hospital, nursing facility, or other institution of
more than 16 beds, that is primarily engaged in providing diagnosis,
treatment, or care of persons with mental diseases, including medical
attention, nursing care, and related services."39
Even though "IMD" was not statutorily defined until 1988, it has
been loosely defined through federal regulations and other internal,
unpublished guidelines of HHS since 1965. The current regulatory
definition states that an IMD is "determined by its overall charac-
ter."40 If the facility is "established and maintained primarily for the
care and treatment of individuals with mental diseases," that facility
is considered an IMD.41
Additionally, HHS uses ten internal and unpublished interpretive
guidelines to determine whether or not a facility has the "overall
character" of an IMD.42 These criteria focus upon two general ar-
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (1988).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 1396d(i).
39. Id. Prior to the enactment of the statutory definition, the term "IMD" was
defined in federal regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services.
"Whether an institution is one for.. . mental diseases will be determined by
whether its overall character is that of a facility established and maintained
primarily for the care and treatment of individuals with ... mental diseases
(whether licensed or not) ....
'Institution for mental diseases' means an institution which is primarily en-
gaged in providing diagnosis, treatment or care of persons with mental dis-
eases, including medical attention, nursing care and related services."
Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524, 531 (1985)
(quoting 45 C.F.R. § 248.60(a)(3)(ii) and (b)(7) (1972)).
40. 42 C.F.R. § 435.1009 (1988).
41. Id. Under the regulatory definition, an institution for the mentally retarded
is not considered an institution for mental diseases. Id.
42. The internal guidelines are as follows:
1. The facility is licensed as a psychiatric facility for the care and treatment
of individuals with mental diseases;
2. The facility advertises or holds itself out as a facility for the care and
treatment of individuals with mental diseases;
[Vol. 17
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eas: the characteristics of a facility's resident population, and the
type of services provided by the facility.43 Considered "useful in
identifying IMDs," no single guideline is determinative in any given
case.44 These guidelines have been highly criticized, and will be
more thoroughly discussed in a subsequent section of this article.
B. The IMD Controversy
Although the IMD exclusion has been in existence since 1965, the
controversy over the correct application of the IMD classification in-
tensified during the late 1970s and early 1980s, reaching a peak in
1989.45 In 1979, HHS conducted an investigation "to determine
whether certain states were discharging patients from mental hospi-
3. The facility is accredited as a psychiatric facility by the JCAH [Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals];
4. The facility specializes in providing psychiatric/psychological care and
treatment. This may be ascertained through review of patients' records. It
may also be indicated by the fact that an unusually large proportion of the
staff has specialized psychiatric/psychological training or by the fact that a
large proportion of the patients are receiving psychopharmacological drugs;
5. The facility is under the jurisdiction of the State's mental health
authority;
6. More than 50 percent of all the patients in the facility have mental dis-
eases which require inpatient treatment according to the patients' medical
records;
7. A large proportion of the patients in the facility have been transferred
from a State mental institution for continuing treatment of their mental
disorders;
8. Independent Professional Review teams report a preponderance of
mental illness in the diagnoses of the patients in the facility (42 C.F.R.
456.1);
9. The average patient age is significantly lower than that of a typical nurs-
ing home;
10. Part or all of the facility consists of locked wards.
MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, A REVIEW OF NURSING FACILITIES DE-
CLARED AS INSTITUTIONS FOR MENTAL DISEASES, 7-8 (1990) [hereinafter REVIEW OF
NURSING FACILITIES] (quoting STATE MEDICAID MANUAL, § 4390 (Sept. 1986 revi-
sion)); see also HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF STATE AGENCY
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, TITLE XIX FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REVIEW GUIDE, No. 2:
IDENTIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR MENTAL DISEASES, 8-18 (Apr. 1987) [hereinafter
TITLE XIX FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REVIEW GUIDE].
43. For a more extensive discussion of the guidelines see, infra notes 137-57 and
accompanying text.
44. TITLE XIX FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 42, at 7.
45. The controversy began over the HHS definition and application of the term
"IMD." For example, in Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance v. Heckler, 471
U.S. 524, 527 n.5 (1985), the HHS applied unpublished guidelines to determine that
a facility in Connecticut was an IMD. The HHS had developed these guidelines to
determine what constitutes "primarily engaged" and "overall character." Although
these guidelines had never before surfaced in departmental audits, the HHS used
these guidelines to disallow funding for a facility that had admitted a number of indi-
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tals and arranging their placement in ICFs in order to circumvent the
Medicaid exclusion for patients under age 65 in IMDs."46
In 1988, the Inspector General's Office notified the Minnesota De-
partment of Human Services of an audit, to be conducted afterJanu-
ary 1, 1989, to identify IMDs. The Department of Human Services
responded by conducting its own investigation, prior to the federal
audit, to determine which facilities would most likely qualify as IMDs
under the federal guidelines.47
The state's investigation first identified "a number of certified
nursing and boarding care homes with more than 16 beds ... as
having at least 50 percent of their residents with physical and MI
[Mental Illness], or MI only, diagnoses."48 Thereafter, sixteen of
these facilities (eleven in Hennepin County alone) were declared
IMDs by the Minnesota Department of Human Services, effective
January 1, 1989.49
Three hundred and twenty-five residents were left without a
source of funding after the state's declaration of the sixteen new
46. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance v. Heckler, 731 F.2d 1052, 1054
(2d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 524 (1985). The court of appeals reversed the district
court's ruling that an ICF cannot also be labeled an IMD, holding instead that the
IMD definition adopted by the HHS furthered congressional intent. See id. at 1060.
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the terms ICF and
IMD were not mutually exclusive. See Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance,
471 US. at 537. See also infra notes 106-36 and accompanying text (discussing further
the issue of mutual exclusivity).
47. See REVIEW OF NURSING FACILITIES, supra note 42, at 16.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 17. Subsequent to theJanuary 1, 1989, effective date, four of these new
IMDs were "undeclared." Thus, the March 1990 study focused upon twelve facilities
rather than the original sixteen. Id. at 3. As of the date of the study, there are thir-
teen declared IMDs: the twelve declared as such on January 1, 1989, and one which
was declared an IMD prior to that date. Id.
The following list shows the NFs in Minnesota that have been classified as IMDs
and the number of residents affected by the classification (current as of March 1990).
Facility Name No. Residents
Bannochie Nursing Home 21
Birchwood Care Home 30
Franklin Place East 19
Grand Avenue Rest Home 6
Hayes Residence 16
Horizon West Health Care Center 56
Minnetonka Health Care Center 12
Queen Care Center 27
Pillsbury Board and Care 16
Southside Care Center 14
Stillwater Residence 15
Northside Residence 17
Andrew Care Home 184
Id. at Appendix I.
[Vol. 17
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IMDs.50 Certain state programs were modified or amended, how-
ever, to ensure adequate coverage of costs. For example, the Minne-
sota General Assistance Program was amended to provide funding
for medical care "for any person.. . over age 18 and who would be
eligible for medical assistance except that the person resides in a fa-
cility that is ... an institution for mental diseases."51
Additional funding was provided through the Minnesota Supple-
mental Aid Program. Because the statutory rate cap under the pro-
gram was too low to provide for full payment to the newly declared
IMD facilities, 52 an amendment was enacted that exempted the IMD
facilities from the rate cap.5 3 This exemption is temporary, how-
ever, and expires July 1, 1991.54
C. Arguments Against the IMD Exclusion
Both in its conception and application, the IMD exclusion is a dis-
criminatory and poorly executed provision. As such, three argu-
ments against the IMD exclusion can be raised. First, the IMD
exclusion violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution,
and thus should be stricken. Second, the IMD classification is mutu-
ally exclusive, and should not be applied to Nursing Facilities (NFs).
And third, the IMD interpretive guidelines are improper and should
be changed to only apply to facilities that provide a specialized de-
gree of mental health services. These arguments will be examined in
greater depth in the sections that follow.
1. Unconstitutionality Under the Equal Protection Clause
a. Rational Basis Test
The court decisions that address the constitutionality of the IMD
exclusion under the equal protection clause have all upheld the ex-
clusion by using the "rational basis" test.55 This well-known test re-
50. Id. at 3, 17.
51. MINN. STAT. § 256D.03, subd. 3(3) (1990).
52. In 1989, the rate paid for long-term care was not to exceed $919.80 per
month. Id. § 2561.05, subd. 1. The maximum rate is increased annually by the lesser
of the percentage of change in the consumer price index, as published by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, or 2.5%. Id. § 2561.05, subd. 7.
53. The amendment provides:
(c) The following residences are exempt from the limit on negotiated rates
and must be reimbursed for documented actual costs, until an alternative
reimbursement system ... is developed by the commissioner:
(2) a residence certified to participate in the medical assistance program
[Medicaid], licensed as a boarding care facility or a nursing home, and de-
clared to be an institution for mental disease byJanuary 1, 1989.
Id. § 2561.05, subd. 2(c).
54. Id. § 2561.05, subd. 2(c)(2).
55. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981) (addressed the constitutionality of
1991]
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quires the party attacking the statutory classification to prove that the
classification is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental
objective.56 It grants a heavy presumption of constitutionality to the
defending government body.57 Statutory classifications are rarely
struck down as unconstitutional under this standard of review.5
8
In Legion v. Richardson,59 the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York found the IMD exclusion constitutional under the
rational basis test. On appeal, the Supreme Court summarily af-
firmed this decision. This 1973 case involved a class action suit
brought on behalf of mentally ill individuals in public mental institu-
tions. The decision was based on a very narrow definition of IMD
that only included state mental hospitals.60 The court's assumption,
that the IMD exclusion only included state mental hospitals, is clear
from both the facts of the case and the statements made by the
court.
6 1
The reasons advanced by the court to uphold the IMD exclusion
the IMD exclusion with respect to the Supplemental Security Income provisions
within the Social Security Act); Legion v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd sub nom. Legion v. Weinberger, 414 U.S. 1058 (1973) (class action to enjoin the
state defendants from refusing to apply for Medicaid funds to provide care and treat-
ment for individuals aged twenty-two through sixty-four in state mental hospitals); see
also Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72, 83 (3d Cir. 1984) (upholding termination of
Medicare, Medicaid, and Supplemental Social Security Income benefits of patients in
a psychiatric hospital which had lost accreditation and certification); Kantrowitz v.
Weinberger, 530 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (statute denying payment for care or
services to persons aged twenty-one through sixty-four, who were patients in institu-
tions for mental disease, not irrational or unconstitutional).
56. Legion v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. at 459.
57. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985).
58. In United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 172 (1980), reh'g
denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1981), the Court, using the rational basis test, held a provision
of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 unconstitutional. The statute entitled certain
employees to "windfall" benefits based solely on whether the employee had a "cur-
rent connection" with the railroad as of December 31, 1974.
59. 354 F. Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. Legion v. Weinberger, 414 U.S.
1058 (1973).
60. This decision can no longer be relied upon because it is not based upon the
current use of the IMD exclusion under the Medicaid Program. Today the IMD clas-
sification is used very broadly, and includes many privately-owned long-term care
facilities. See infra notes 137-57 and accompanying text (discussing the expanded us-
age of the IMD classification).
61. The following excerpts from the court's opinion show the court's focus on
state mental institutions:
"It is the thrust of plaintiffs' contention that the restrictions contained in ...
Medicaid legislation result in arbitrary and invidious discrimination against public
mental institution patients. These patients . . .continue to receive inadequate care in
that the state mental institutions receive no federal funds to supplement inadequate state
appropriations." Legion v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. at 458 (emphasis added).
"In holding as we do, we are not ... blind to the deplorable conditions that
[Vol. 17
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show the court only considered state mental hospitals in its deci-
sion.62 Thus, the reasoning of the court addressed the IMD exclu-
sion only as the exclusion applied to state mental hospitals. No
justification was shown for applying the IMD exclusion to private
long-term care facilities.
The first reason given by the court was that "[a]t the time of the
passage of. . .Medicaid, Congress had determined that advances
made in treating mental patients were sufficient to indicate that many
would soon be treated in facilities where more remedial benefits
were available."63 In other words, it was not necessary for the Medi-
caid Program to extend to individuals in state hospitals. These indi-
viduals would soon be treated in facilities that provided more
advanced treatment and also qualified for benefits under the Medi-
caid Program or similar non-state funded programs.
Second, the court referred to "the belief by Congress that care of
the mentally ill in state hospitals was the responsibility of the
states." 64 Here, again, the court found justification for the IMD ex-
clusion based on a consideration of state mental hospitals only.
Since state mental hospitals are operated, governed, and financed by
the state, it is easy to find justification for the states to retain respon-
sibility for individuals within state facilities.
Later, in a 5-4 decision in Schweiker v. Wilson, the Supreme Court
upheld the IMD exclusion under the rational basis test. The
Schweiker Court overturned the lower court's determination that the
exclusion was unconstitutional.65 To support the IMD exclusion,
the Court found an identifiable governmental objective in Congress'
need to limit federal spending under the Social Security Act.66 The
Court also found that states have a " 'traditional' responsibility to
care for those institutionalized in public mental institutions."67 The
Court added that statutory classifications " '[do] not offend the Con-
stitution simply because the classification "is not made with mathe-
matical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequity .... 68
On the surface, the Schweiker decision appears to strengthen and
broaden Legion, and put an end to the issue of whether the IMD ex-
characterize America's public mental institutions-America's Willowbrooks." Id. at 459
(emphasis added).
62. Id.
63. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2084-87).
64. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2086).
65. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
66. Id. at 238-39.
67. Id. at 236-37.
68. Id. at 234 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1972), quoting
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
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clusion is constitutional. There are, however, two reasons why the
Schweiker ruling should not be the last word on the constitutionality
of the IMD exclusion.
First, like the Legion court, the Schweiker Court did not focus on the
current application of the IMD exclusion. Instead, like Legion, the
Schweiker opinion focuses on public mental institutions.69 As stated
by Justice Blackmun, "[T]he issue in this case is whether Congress
constitutionally may decline to grant ... benefits to a class of other-
wise eligible individuals . . . in public mental institutions that do not
receive Medicaid funds for their care." 70
But even more significantly, the Schweiker Court analyzed the con-
stitutionality of the IMD exclusion as the exclusion relates to Supple-
mental Security Income (SSI) Program benefits, rather than as the
exclusion relates to Medicaid benefits.71 The SSI Program is an in-
dependent program under the Social Security Act which, in addition
to other benefits, provides a small stipend to individuals in long-term
care facilities who are eligible for the Medicaid Program.72 Conse-
quently, individuals who were barred by the IMD exclusion from
Medicaid eligibility were also barred from receiving the small stipend
under the SSI Program.
The appellees in Schweiker were residents in a public mental institu-
tion who were denied benefits under the Medicaid Program because
of the IMD exclusion.73 But, the appellees' challenge of the IMD
exclusion was not focused on Medicaid benefits directly.74 Rather,
the appellees challenged the IMD exclusion because the exclusion
prevented them from receiving the stipend they would otherwise be
entitled to under the SSI Program. 75
Many of the issues and arguments regarding the IMD exclusion
69. The terms "public mental institution" and "state mental hospital" appear to
be used interchangeably in Schweiker and Legion.
70. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 222 (1981) (emphasis added).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 224. The main benefit provided under the SSI Program is "a subsis-
tence allowance . . . to the Nation's needy aged, blind, and disabled." Id. at 223
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1382c (1988)). In this case, however, only a small stipend, not
to exceed $300 per month, was denied, not the subsistence allowance. Id. at 224.
73. Id. at 228 n.9 (defining the class in a previous class action of which the cur-
rent plaintiffs were a part).
74. The Schweiker appellees most likely avoided a direct challenge to the IMD
exclusion because of the recent decision in Legion v. Weinberger upholding the exclu-
sion. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
75. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 225 (1981). The Court, characterizing
the appellees' position, said:
Appellees brought this suit to challenge .. . Congress' having conditioned
the limited assistance grant on eligibility for Medicaid: a person between the
ages of 21 through 64 who resides in a public mental institution is not eligi-
ble to receive this small stipend, even though that person meets the other
eligibility requirements for SSI benefits, because treatment in a public
[Vol. 17
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 16
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss1/16
IMD EXCLUSION
are the same under either the Medicaid or the SSI Programs. In fact,
in the absence of any significant legislative history behind the SSI
Program, the Schweiker Court even borrowed legislative history from
the Medicaid Program to show the IMD classification was rationally
related to a legitimate governmental objective under the SSI Pro-
gram. 76 The Court justified borrowing of the legislative history by
finding that Congress intentionally piggy-backed the SSI Program el-
igibility requirements on those of the Medicaid Program. 77
Despite the similar application of the IMD exclusion in both the
Medicaid and SSI Programs, the decision in Schweiker should not
carry back to the IMD exclusion as it applies to Medicaid benefits.
Even though the Court borrowed the Medicaid legislative history,
and worked through an analytical framework that would also apply to
the IMD exclusion under the Medicaid Program, the effects of the
exclusion under the two programs are vastly different.
The effects the IMD exclusion has on individuals under the Medi-
caid Program are significantly more severe than the effects of the ex-
clusion under the SSI Program. Under the Medicaid Program, the
IMD exclusion bars individuals from receiving federal funds for med-
ical and long-term care. Under the SSI Program, the IMD exclusion
only bars individuals from receiving a small stipend. In the Schweiker
opinion, Justice Blackmun supported the Court's holding that the
application of the IMD exclusion to the SSI Program is constitutional
by stating that "[alt the most, this legislation incidentally denies a small
mental institution for a person in this age bracket is not funded under
Medicaid.
Id. (footnote omitted).
76. See id. at 236-37. The Court noted that "[t]he Medicaid limitation was based
on Congress' assumption that the care of persons in public mental institutions was
properly a responsibility of the States." Id. at 237 n.19, (quoting H.R. REP. No.
1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1949)); S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,
at 144-47 (1965).
77. See Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 235-37.
The limited nature of Medicaid eligibility did not pass unnoticed by the en-
acting Congress. In the same bill that established the SSI program, Con-
gress considered, and passed, an amendment to Medicaid, providing
coverage of inpatient services to a large number of the juvenile needy in
public mental institutions .... This legislative history shows that Congress
was aware ... of the limitations in the Medicaid program that would restrict
eligibility for the reduced SSI benefits; we decline to regard such deliberate
action as the result of inadvertence or ignorance.
Id. at 235-36 (citations and footnote omitted). The provision which provides Medi-
caid coverage for minors is found at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(16) (1988). Coverage is pro-
vided for certain inpatient psychiatric hospital services rendered to persons under
twenty-one years of age. Id. § 1396d(h)(l). "To be eligible ... [such persons] must
be receiving 'active treatment' that meets standards prescribed by the Secretary and
that 'can reasonably be expected to improve the condition, by reason of which such
services are necessary, to the extent that eventually such services will no longer be
necessary.'" Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 236 n.18 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(h)(l)(B)).
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monthly comfort benefit to a certain number of persons suffering from
mental illness .... "78 This variance of effect is a compelling reason
to re-examine the constitutionality of the IMD exclusion with respect
to the denial of Medicaid benefits.
b. Heightened Standard of Review
The appellees in Schweiker argued that the mentally ill should be
considered a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class, entitled to a height-
ened standard of review.7O This standard of review would require
the governmental body defending the legislative classification to
prove that the classification is necessary to serve a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. 80 Under this standard of review, legislative clas-
sifications are rarely upheld.
The appellees in Schweiker argued that the review of the IMD exclu-
sion should "'be subjected to a heightened standard of review' be-
cause the mentally ill 'historically have been subjected to purposeful
unequal treatment; [because] they have been relegated to a position
of political powerlessness; [because] prejudice against them curtails
their participation in the pluralist political system and strips them of
political protection against discriminatory legislation.' "81 The
Court in Schweiker, however, found "no occasion to reach this issue"
because the express language of the statutory exclusion showed no
direct impact based on the mental health classification. 82 The Court
found that the exclusion did not just single out mentally ill individu-
als. Rather, the Court found that the IMD exclusion imposes
78. Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 231 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 230.
The district court in Legion briefly mentioned the heightened standard of review
when a class is deemed suspect, the strict judicial scrutiny standard, but concluded
without analysis that "a patently invidious discrimination" did not evolve from the
IMD exclusion. Legion v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 456, 459 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub
nom. Legion v. Weinberger, 414 U.S. 1058 (1973).
80. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985) (When statutes are written in a manner which classifies by race, alienage, or
national origin, "these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only
if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.").
81. Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 230 (citation omitted).
82. Id. at 231. Specifically, the Court stated:
We have no occasion to reach this issue because we conclude that this stat-
ute does not classify directly on the basis of mental health. The SSI pro-
gram distinguishes among three groups of persons, all of whom meet the
basic eligibility requirements: persons not in a "public institution" may re-
ceive full benefits; persons in a "public institution" of a certain nature
("hospital, extended care facility, nursing home, or intermediate care facility
receiving payments (with respect to such individual or spouse) .. .under [Medicaid])"
(emphasis added), may receive reduced benefits; and persons in any other
"public institution" may not receive any benefits.
Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
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equivalent deprivation to a group that only partially consists of men-
tally ill individuals, while at the same time, provides benefits to sub-
stantial numbers of mentally ill individuals outside the identified
group.8 3
The Court's conclusion cannot be disputed. Under the current ap-
plication of the IMD exclusion, all individuals between twenty-one
and sixty-four years of age in IMDs fall within the exclusion, whether
or not they are mentally ill. And some individuals with mental illness
who have found placement in non-IMD Nursing Facilities (NFs) are
receiving Medicaid benefits.
Although the IMD exclusion does not specifically and precisely tar-
get and affect only the mentally ill, this group is predominantly af-
fected. Many facilities have been declared IMDs because fifty
percent or more of their resident population consisted of individuals
with mental illness. Thus, the group that is subsequently denied
Medicaid benefits predominantly consists of individuals with mental
illness.
This underinclusiveness appears to be intentional. By not includ-
ing all individuals with mental illness, the exclusion has escaped the
harsh scrutiny that would accompany a perfectly inclusive classifica-
tion of all mentally ill. Instead the IMD exclusion targets a specific
type of facility (IMDs), and allows federal funding for those mentally
ill individuals who have found placement in non-IMD NFs. By set-
ting forth the current IMD exclusion in this way, the HHS has
avoided the long-term care expense of vast numbers of individuals
with mental illness who live in IMDs.
The Court in Schweiker suggested that the heightened scrutiny is-
sue could be further examined if there was evidence that the IMD
classification imposed a disproportionate, direct impact on the class
of mentally ill. This issue was dismissed, however, because the rec-
ord did not present any statistical support.84 If the current applica-
tion of the IMD exclusion had been brought before the Schweiker
Court, and the constitutionality issue had been analyzed with respect
83. Id. "The group thus singled out for special treatment... does not entirely
exclude the mentally ill. In fact, it includes, in a sizable proportion to the total popu-
lation receiving SSI benefits, large numbers of mentally ill people." Id. (footnote
omitted).
84. Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 234. The Court noted that
appellees have failed to produce any evidence that the intent of Congress
was to classify on the basis of mental health. Appellees admit that no such
evidence exists; indeed, they rely on the absence of explicit intent as proof
of Congress' "inattention" to their needs and, therefore, its prejudice
against them. As in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), the indirect
deprivation worked by this legislation upon appellees' class, whether or not
the class is considered "suspect," does not without more move us to regard
it with a heightened scrutiny.
Id. at 233-34 (citation omitted).
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to the denial of Medicaid benefits rather than SSI benefits, the out-
come would surely have been different. Today, the record could eas-
ily be filled with enough statistical support for the Court to find a
disproportionate and direct impact on the mentally ill.85
A later decision by the Supreme Court in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center86 appears to have closed the door that was left partially
open in Schweiker, that the mentally ill could possibly be considered a
"suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class. The Court in Cleburne advanced
several reasons for overturning a lower court decision that declared
the class of the mentally retarded as a suspect class.87 Explaining
85. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (current statistics showing the
impact the IMD exclusion currently has on the mentally ill).
86. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). In
July 1980, co-respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building in Cleburne, Texas.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) intended to lease this building from Hannah and
use it as a group home for the mentally retarded. The home was to provide housing
for thirteen mentally retarded men and women, with CLC staff members providing
constant supervision. Id. at 435.
The city of Cleburne informed CLC that the home was classified as a hospital for
the feeble-minded and that under the zoning regulations applicable to the desired
site, a special use permit was required to run the home. CLC applied for the permit.
Following a public hearing, the city council voted down CLC's application by a three-
to-one vote. Id. at 436-37.
CLC filed a suit in federal district court against the city and a number of its
officials, claiming that the zoning ordinance discriminated against the mentally re-
tarded in violation of the equal protection rights of CLC and its residents, and that
the ordinance was invalid on its face and as applied. The district court, employing
the minimum level ofjudicial scrutiny, held the ordinance and its application consti-
tutional. The court concluded that no fundamental right was implicated and that
mental retardation was neither a suspect nor a quasi-suspect classification. Id. at 437.
CLC appealed and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding
the city ordinance invalid as applied. The court, applying an intermediate level of
scrutiny test, held that the ordinance was invalid on its face because it did not sub-
stantially further any important governmental interest. Id. at 437-38. See also City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984).
87. One point which must be emphasized is that the "mentally retarded" are
considered separate from "other groups," such as the "mentally ill." See Cleburne,
473 U.S. at 445-46.
Generally, where a group of individuals affected by a law have distinguishing
characteristics relevant to the interests of the state, courts have been reluctant to
closely scrutinize legislative action. Legislatures at the national and state level should
be free to decide whether, how, and to what extent those interests should be pur-
sued. Id. at 441-42.
Specific reasons given by the Court were:
(1) Those who are mentally retarded have a reduced ability to cope with the
daily requirements of life. The state interest in dealing with and providing for
these individuals is a legitimate one. Id. at 442.
(2) There has been significant legislative response to the problems of the men-
tally retarded. Therefore, there is no apparent need to classify the mentally re-
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that the treatment of the mentally retarded is a difficult and technical
matter that must be left to the legislature, the Court concluded:
[I]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were
deemed quasi-suspect .... it would be difficult to find a principled
way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have perhaps im-
mutable disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot them-
selves mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can
claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at
large. One need mention in this respect only the aging, the dis-
abled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We are reluctant to set out on
that course, and we decline to do so.
8 8
After refusing to acknowledge the mentally retarded (and the men-
tally ill) as even a quasi-suspect class subject to a "middle level scru-
tiny," the Court in Cleburne stated that the class is not left
"unprotected from invidious discrimination."89 The Court stressed
that "[t]o withstand equal protection review, legislation that distin-
guishes between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose." 9 0 The Court subse-
quently returned a rare decision under the rational basis test, strik-
ing down the zoning ordinance at issue as unconstitutional.91
There has been much discussion over whether the Court in
Cleburne applied the rational basis test or a heightened standard of
review.92 Although the Court examined four different reasons pro-
vided by the Council to uphold the ordinance,93 the majority did not
(3) The legislative response has been supported by the public. This is direct
evidence that the mentally retarded, as a group, have the political power to affect
the decisions of lawmakers. Id. at 445.
(4) The group of individuals which can be characterized as mentally retarded is
a large group, large enough to effectively demand legislative action. To include
the mentally retarded among those groups considered quasi-suspect would make
distinguishing the mentally retarded from those persons in greater need ofjudi-
cial protection very difficult. Id. at 445-47.
88. Id. at 445-46 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 446.
90. Id.
91. In striking down the ordinance, the Court noted that the city did not require
special use permits for apartments, multiple dwellings, hospitals, sanitariums, or
nursing homes in the same or similarly classified zones. By requiring CLC to obtain a
special use permit, the city of Cleburne was depriving CLC of equal protection of the
laws. For that reason the Court did not decide whether Cleburne "may never insist
on a special use permit for a home for the mentally retarded" in the zone types in
question; that is, the Court did not decide whether the ordinance was facially invalid
when mentally retarded individuals are involved. Id. at 447-48.
92. Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority's as-applied method of reaching
its conclusion. He found that, in spite of the invalidation of the ordinance on rational
basis grounds, the ordinance should be subject to "the sort of probing inquiry associ-
ated with heightened scrutiny." Id. at 458. See also infra note 96.
93. The four reasons given by the council were:
(1) The majority of property owners within 200 feet of the home had a negative
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find any of these reasons to be rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose. 94 According to the dissent in Cleburne,95 the ma-
jority applied a heightened level of review under the rational basis
test.9 6 The dissent explained that "Cleburne's ordinance surely
would be valid under the traditional rational basis test applicable to
economic and commercial regulation."97
In a concurring opinion,98 Justice Stevens also addressed
problems with the manner in which the Court defined the two stan-
dards of review in equal protection cases. He suggested that the "ra-
tional basis" test and the "strict scrutiny" test are extremes that do
not adequately explain the decisional process.99
In my own approach to these cases, I have always asked myself
whether I could find a "rational basis" for the classification at is-
sue .... In every equal protection case, we have to ask certain basic
questions. What class is harmed by the legislation, and has it been
subjected to a "tradition of disfavor" by our laws? What is the pub-
lic purpose that is being served by the law? What is the characteris-
tic of the disadvantaged class that justifies the disparate
treatment? 100
Perhaps if the constitutionality of the IMD exclusion was brought
before the Court today (in the heat of the IMD controversy, as more
and more facilities are being classified as IMDs), the Court would
consider some of the questions posed in Justice Stevens' concur-
rence. Like the decision in Cleburne, the governmental objectives be-
hind the IMD exclusion perhaps would not be considered legitimate
enough to allow such adverse effects on the mentally ill.
In summary, the constitutionality of the current IMD exclusion is
attitude about the home. In addition, elderly residents in the area were afraid to
have mentally retarded people living in their neighborhood. Id. at 448.
(2) The facility was located across the street from a junior high school and stu-
dents of that school might harass residents of the home. Id. at 449.
(3) The house was located on a flood plain. Id.
(4) The house was too small to accommodate the proposed number of residents.
Id. at 449-50.
94. Id. at 448.
95. Id. at 455 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
96. Justice Marshall explained that a "heightened scrutiny or 'second order' ra-
tional basis review, is a method of approaching certain classifications skeptically, with
judgment suspended until the facts are in and the evidence considered." Id. at 471-
72. Under this level of scrutiny, courts will not intrude on the legislative process.
But, where there has been prejudice in the past and the threat remains, heightened
scrutiny is appropriate. Id. at 472. According to Justice Marshall, the as-applied
method used by the majority left the city of Cleburne without sufficient guidance to
decide to whom the ordinance should be applied. Id. at 474.
97. Id. at 456.
98. Id. at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 452-53.
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unresolved. Although the Supreme Court upheld the classification
under the rational basis test,' 0 ' the Schweiker Court did not examine
the exclusion in its current context. Instead, the holding focused on
the IMD exclusion as it relates to public/state mental hospitals and
nominal SSI benefits. The Supreme Court has not addressed the
constitutionality of the IMD exclusion in its current context as it af-
fects the residents of many private long-term care facilities.
Additionally, Schweiker analyzed the constitutionality issue with re-
spect to the effects on beneficiaries of the SSI Program. The reasons
and statistics given to support the exclusion were directly related to
nominal benefits under the SSI Program, rather than the substantial
long-term care benefits provided under the Medicaid Program. Fi-
nally, even though the IMD exclusion has been upheld in these cases,
each court expressed support for the opposing view. The Court in
Schweiker expressed disapproval of Congress' IMD exclusion. In ref-
erence to the rational basis test, the Court stated that the test "does
not allow us to substitute our personal notions of good public policy
for those of Congress."102 The Court went on to say that "we must
disregard the existence of other methods of allocation that we, as
individuals, perhaps would have preferred." 10S
The district court in Legion v. Richardson also explained:
In holding as we do, we are not unsympathetic to plaintiffs' allega-
tions that the mentally ill have not received adequate care, nor are
we blind to the deplorable conditions that characterize America's
public mental institutions.... But confronted with a naked consti-
tutional issue we are unable to afford plaintiffs the only remedy
available-a declaration that the challenged legislation is
unconstitutional. ' 0 4
The court concluded with a rare expression of appreciation to the
attorney for the mentally ill in this case "for his devoted efforts to
attempt to benefit a class of individuals who seem clearly to be in
need of assistance."105
2. Mutually Exclusive Classifications
An alternative position adopted in opposition to the IMD exclu-
101. In this regard it is important to note that the Supreme Court only summarily
affirmed the district court in Legion v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
sub nom. Legion v. Weinberger, 414 U.S. 1058 (1973). Thus, the Legion decision,
carrying no precedential value, is referred to for persuasive and illustrative purposes
only.
102. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981).
103. Id.
104. Legion, 354 F. Supp. at 459. In Legion, the district court held that the chal-
lenged legislation was constitutionally valid. Accordingly, the action, based upon
equal protection and due process grounds, was dismissed. Id.
105. Id. at 460.
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sion is that the IMD classification and the other Medicaid facility clas-
sifications are mutually exclusive. This means that a private facility
that is already licensed as a Nursing Facility (NF) (previously, Inter-
mediate Care Facility (ICF) or Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF)) should
not also be classified as an IMD.106
In 1985, the Supreme Court in Connecticut Department of Income
Maintenance v. Heckler reviewed the mutual exclusivity issue to resolve
"[t]he square conflict on an important question of statutory con-
struction" between the Eighth and Second Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals.107 The Court supported the Second Circuit decision, and
held that the two terms "IMD" and "ICF" in the Medicaid Program
were not mutually exclusive, and therefore, an ICF might also be
classified as an IMD.108 The Court supported this conclusion by
stating that "[t]he thrice-repeated [IMD] exclusion demonstrates
that Congress did not intend the ICF and IMD categories to be mu-
tually exclusive; if Congress had intended separate categories, the
IMD exclusion from services in other types of facilities would be un-
necessary and illogical."' 0 9
The Court's mutual exclusivity analysis was, however, incomplete.
In determining the scope and definition of the term "IMD," the
106. Prior to the introduction of the NF classification in October 1990, the IMD
exclusion was entirely separate from the ICF and SNF statutory definitions. An IMD
was defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(i) (1988) and set out as exclusionary at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396d(a) (1988). For specific statutory language, see supra notes 31 and 33. The
NF definition, however, includes one phrase that brings a portion of the IMD defini-
tion within the NF definition with an exclusionary effect. The definition limits quali-
fying NF facilities to those which are "not primarily for the care and treatment of
mental diseases." 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a)(1) (1988). This language is similar to lan-
guage contained in the definition of an IMD. See id. § 1396d(i). Although the mutu-
ally exclusive argument may be somewhat weakened by the inclusion of the IMD
language in the NF definition, the argument is nevertheless relevant because the NF
definition also includes the ICF and SNF definitions. For the definition of NF, see
supra note 21.
107. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524, 528
(1985). The state of Connecticut maintained that Medicaid should be available to
mentally ill persons in ICFs since the intent of the statute was to exclude only public
mental hospitals. The state supported its position by stating that the distinction was
"designed to encourage the placement of mental patients in ICF's, an alternative and
favored type of facility." Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance v. Heckler, 731
F.2d 1052, 1056 (2d Cir. 1984), aft'd, 471 U.S. 524 (1985). Connecticut argued that
Congress was concerned about funding certain types of facilities, and was not con-
cerned about limiting funding based on the individual's diagnosis. Id.
108. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 471 U.S. at 537, 538.
109. Id. at 529. The Court further noted that other provisions of the Act clearly
establish that services performed for the mentally ill may be covered if performed in
a hospital, SNF, or an ICF that is not an IMD. Id.
While the Court did not explicitly address the mutual exclusivity issue in relation
to SNFs, its analysis would appear to also extend to the old SNF classification. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
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Court incorrectly restricted its analysis to the statutory and regula-
tory provisions surrounding the IMD exclusion, without examining
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) interpre-
tive IMD guidelines. I10
The IMD guidelines are the very life of the IMD exclusion and
provide the most specific definition. These guidelines provide the
only detailed and practical definition of an IMD, and are the basis for
IMD classifications. Therefore, the Court's analysis of the IMD ex-
clusion was incomplete without examining the HHS interpretive
IMD guidelines.
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Minnesota v.
Heckler, II' did include the interpretive IMD guidelines as part of its
analysis of the proper use of the IMD classification and arrived at the
conclusion that the ICF and IMD classifications were mutually exclu-
sive. 112 Although the court refrained from specifically stating that an
ICF could never be classified as an IMD, the court's analysis and con-
clusions support the position that the two classifications were in-
tended to be mutually exclusive.
110. The HHS guidelines were recently amended. At the time of Minnesota v.
Heckler, 718 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1983), however, the guidelines were as follows:
1. A facility is licensed as a mental institution;
2. It advertises as a mental institution;
3. More than 50 percent of the patients have a disability in mental
functioning [as defined in the International Classification of Diseases];
4. It concentrates on managing patients with behavior or functional
disorders and is used largely by mental hospitals for alternative care;
5. It is under the jurisdiction of the mental health authority;
6. It is frequently or predominantly used for individuals who are
either discharged from mental hospitals or would otherwise be admitted to
them;
7. The facility is in proximity to a State Mental Institution (for exam-
ple, within a 25-mile radius);
8. The age distribution is uncharacteristic of nursing home patients;
and
9. The basis of Medicaid eligibility for patients under 65 is a mental
disability.
Id. at 862 (citing a Departmental "intra-office instructional bulletin[] to assist federal
field office personnel in their determinations as to the 'overall character' of a facil-
ity"). For the text of the new guidelines, see supra note 42.
111. 718 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1983). There, the State of Minnesota brought suit
against Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary of the HHS, contesting Heckler's decision to
disallow federal financial participation to three Minnesota community residential fa-
cilities under the Medicaid Program. Heckler had decided that the facilities were
IMDs and thus did not qualify for partial reimbursement by Medicaid. Id. at 855.
The court concluded that the HHS acted contrary to statutory provisions by clas-
sifying the three facilities as IMDs. The court held that an IMD is distinguished from
an ICF by the degree of care and treatment required by the mental and physical
conditions of the patients in the facility, not the mere presence of patients diagnosed
with a mental disability. Id. at 866.
112. Id. at 861-62; see also supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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First, the Eighth Circuit found that the statutory definition of an
ICF
supplies manifest clarification not only of what an ICF is, but more
importantly .... how an IMD is and is not to be exclusively charac-
terized. The ICF definition expressly authorizes care of patients in
an ICF with diagnoses of either 'mental or physical condition[s]' as
long as the illnesses involved 'require' a lesser 'degree of care and
treatment' than a hospital or SNF provides. 113
This definition alone rebuts the contention of HHS that an ICF can
be labeled an IMD merely because mentally ill individuals are pres-
ent in the facility.
Further, the Eighth Circuit examined the legislative history behind
ICF coverage under the Medicaid Program. The court found that
ICF coverage was added in 1971 for individuals who would other-
wise require placement in a mental hospital or skilled nursing facil-
ity.t"4 Therefore, applying the IMD exclusion to ICFs, "negates a
portion of the statute by encroaching upon the intended role Con-
gress determined intermediate care facilities were designed to
serve." 115
In the absence of a statutory definition of an IMD, the Eighth Cir-
113. Minnesota v. Heckler, 718 F.2d at 863. The court noted that "many persons
within an ICF may be deaf or blind or have other physical ailments in conjunction
with associated mental problems." Id. at 863 n.20. In comparison, the court cited an
earlier Eighth Circuit opinion suggesting that statutory limitations for IMDs " 'do not
apply to mental health problems in general.' " Id. (quoting Pinneke v. Preisser, 623
F.2d 546, 550 (8th Cir. 1980)). This ICF definition has been incorporated, almost
verbatim, into the NF statutory definition, and thus remains an issue today. The ex-
act language of the NF definition includes:
[T]he term "nursing facility" means an institution ... which.., is primarily
engaged in providing to residents ... on a regular basis, health-related care
and services to individuals who because of their mental or physical condition
require care and services (above the level of room and board) which can be
made available to them only through institutional facilities ....
42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a)(1) (1988). The NF definition, however, also includes the IMD
exclusion, by adding language excluding facilities which are "primarily for the care
and treatment of mental diseases." Id.
114. Minnesota v. Heckler, 718 F.2d at 864. See also 117 CONG. REC. 44,721 (1971)
(Statement of Senator Long citing Report of Senate Finance Committee). The com-
mittee report indicated that the intent of the statute was to assure that each category
of patient was properly placed. In addition, Congress intended to "provide a less
costly institutional alternative" than "skilled nursing home care" for those who did
not need the services provided thereunder. Id.
115. Minnesota v. Heckler, 718 F.2d at 865. The court also noted the flaws inherent
in the HHS guidelines. Basically, the criteria do not indicate the nature of services
being furnished by the facility. In addition, "'enforcement [of the guidelines] may
provide an undesirable incentive for substitution of nonpsychiatric diagnoses and
transfer of patients to avoid reaching guideline percentile.' " Id. at 865 n.25 (quoting
discussion paper titled "Redefinition on Institution of Mental Diseases").
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cuit continued its analysis by examining the regulatory definition. At
that time, the federal regulations defined an IMD as an institution
primarily engaged in providing diagnosis, treatment or care of per-
sons with mental diseases, including medical attention, nursing
care and related services. Whether an institution is an institution
for mental diseases is determined by its overall character as that of a
facility established and maintained primarily for the care and treat-
ment of individuals with mental diseases, whether or not it is li-
censed as such. 16
Unless the "overall character" test in the federal regulation refers
only to a heightened degree of mental health care and services not
ordinarily provided in an ICF, this regulatory definitionl7 en-
croached upon the statutory definition of an ICF. 118 Since the statu-
tory definition of an ICF at that time allowed Medicaid payment for
individuals "who because of their mental or physical condition re-
quire care and services which can be made available to them only
through institutional facilities,"I19 federal regulations which render
a facility an IMD merely because it provides such allowable services
would undercut the statutory definition of an ICF.
Next, the court examined the IMD guidelines employed by the
HHS to determine whether a facility's overall character is that of an
IMD.120 The court found that the HHS "acted contrary to statutory
provisions and congressional intent when . .. it employed criteria
chiefly focusing on the mere presence in each facility of patients with
diagnoses of a mental disability."121 The court held that the "cardi-
nal gauge by which to distinguish IMDs and ICFs must be the degree
of care and treatment required by the mental or physical conditions
of patients at any given facility."' 22 The court also suggested that
the ICF, SNF, and IMD categories should designate the degree of
care and treatment available within facilities, and that the HHS
should be able to use patient admission and review standards to in-
sure proper patient placement within facilities.123
Finally, the court examined the legislative history behind the en-
actment of the IMD exclusion. The initial reason for the IMD exclu-
116. 42 C.F.R. § 435.1009e (1982) (emphasis added). The statutory definition of
an IMD has remained unchanged. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.1009 (1989).
117. The regulations do not specifically define an ICF. See supra note 18 for the
definition of a resident of an ICF prior to the changes effective October 1990.
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
119. Id.
120. See Minnesota v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 852, 862 (8th Cir. 1983).
121. Id. at 866.
122. Id.
123. The emphasis on the degree of care, in theory, would eliminate the concern
of the HHS that Medicaid benefits not be provided to IMD facilities that do not pro-
vide the level of care required by a patient's mental diagnosis. See id. at 866 n.27.
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sion was that" 'long-term care in such hospitals had traditionally been
accepted as a responsibility of the States.' "124 This language indi-
cates that the IMD exclusion was intended to only exclude state
mental hospitals.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Connecticut Department of In-
come Maintenance 125 never reached the critical issues that were drawn
out by the Eighth Circuit Court in Minnesota v. Heckler.126 While the
Supreme Court employed an independent standard of review during
its statutory analysis of the IMD exclusion, the Court changed its
scope of review when it analyzed the HHS regulations and guide-
lines.127 The Court stated that "the agency's construction need not
be the only reasonable one in order to gain judicial approval," and
approved the HHS regulations without analysis.128
The Court also cited the Social Security Act as support for this
decision, stating, "The Act expressly provides the Secretary with au-
thority to 'make and publish such rules and regulations, not inconsis-
tent with' the Act 'as may be necessary [for the Act's] efficient
administration.' "129 The Court concluded, without analysis, that
"the Secretary's interpretation of 'institution for mental diseases'
comports with the plain language of the statute," and upheld the de-
124. Id. at 863 (quoting Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 237 n.19 (1981)) (em-
phasis added).
125. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524 (1985).
126. Minnesota v. Hechler, 718 F.2d at 852.
127. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 471 U.S. at 532.
128. Id.
The Supreme Court did, however, briefly discuss the state's second contention,
but found such contention without merit. The state argued that disallowance under-
mined the cooperative federalism concept on which public assistance programs are
based. The Court agreed that the general policy of federal-state cooperation favors a
liberal interpretation of the eligibility provisions of the Act. Nevertheless, the Court
felt that disallowance was necessary to "respect the apparent limits that Congress
ha(d] placed on its own decision to fund the implementation of sound policy." Id. at
532 n.22.
129. Id. at 530 n.16 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1302).
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984), the Supreme Court upheld the Environmental Protection Agency's interpre-
tation of the phrase "stationary source" within the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970. In doing so, the Court stated that the Court had long recognized that consid-
erable weight should be given to an executive department's construction of a statute.
The Court went on to state that
the principle of deference to administrative interpretations "has been con-
sistently followed by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or
reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full
understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation has
depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters sub-
jected to agency regulations."
Id. at 844 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961)).
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cision of the Second Circuit.130
The Supreme Court also incorrectly concluded that "it is perfectly
clear that hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, and intermediate care
facilities are not ineligible [under Medicaid] simply because they pro-
vide care and treatment for mentally ill patients."131 A simple read-
ing of the guidelines shows that this conclusion is unfounded. The
guidelines expressly exclude facilities from the Medicaid Program
that provide care and treatment for mentally ill patients if fifty per-
cent of the resident population consists of mentally ill individuals. 132
If the Court would have followed the Eighth Circuit in employing an
independent standard of review of the HHS guidelines, and would
have examined the guidelines, rather than giving deference to the
HHS, the Court could not have reached this conclusion.
The Supreme Court's decision in Connecticut Department of Income
Maintenance also conflicts with prior reasoning relied upon in
Schweiker to render the IMD exclusion constitutional. In Schweiker,' 33
the Court relied on the premise that the statutory IMD exclusion
"does not classify directly on the basis of mental health."l34 On the
130. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 471 U.S. at 538. The Court only refer-
enced the regulations by stating that "there was ample evidence for the review team's
conclusion that Middletown was 'primarily engaged' in providing diagnostic treat-
ment and care for persons with mental diseases within the meaning of the applicable
regulations." Id. at 526-27. The Court set forth the HHS criteria:
The Secretary has developed criteria designed to focus on what constitutes
'primarily engaged" and "overall character." The review team utilized the
following criteria when evaluating Middletown Haven:
1. That a facility is licensed as a mental institution;
2. That it advertises or holds itself out as a mental institution;
3. That more than 50% of the patients have a disability in mental
functioning;
4. That it is used by mental hospitals for alternative care;
5. That patients who may have entered a mental hospital are accepted di-
rectly from the community;
6. That the facility is in proximity to a state mental institution (within a 25-
mile radius);
7. That the age distribution is uncharacteristic of nursing home patients;
8. That the basis of Medicaid eligibility for patients under 65 is due to a
mental disability, exclusive of services in an institution for mental disease;
9. That the facility hires staff specialized in the care of the mentally ill; and
10. That independent professional reviews conducted by state teams report
a preponderance of mental patients in the facility.
Id. at 527 n.5; see also REVIEW OF NURSING FACILITIES, supra note 42, at 7-8 (guidelines
used by the Minnesota Department of Human Services).
131. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 471 U.S. at 536. This conclusion was
based upon the Court's interpretation of the legislative history of the IMD exclusion.
Id.
132. See supra note 130.
133. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 231 (1980).
134. Id. at 231. The conclusion here was based upon the Court's reasoning that
the statute did not isolate the mentally ill, or subject the mentally ill to special or
subordinate treatment. At the most, the Court stated, the statute denied "a small
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contrary, the holding of the Second Circuit specifically states that
"the IMD exclusion virtually compels [the HHS to employ guidelines
which] focus on the nature of the illnesses treated rather than the
care furnished." 3 5
In conclusion, the Court's avoidance of the underlying issues in
Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance resulted in a decision that
was very unfavorable for the mentally ill. By avoiding an analysis of
the interpretive IMD guidelines, the Court conveniently avoided crit-
icism from both the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment that would result from a decision finding the IMD classification
and the other Medicaid facility classifications mutually exclusive. By
the Court's own admission, the state, representing the mentally ill,
"persuasively argued that its position represent[ed] sound and en-
lightened policy."' 36 A more in depth analysis of the interpretive
IMD guidelines would most likely have caused the Court to overturn
Congress' and the HHS longstanding position that the IMD exclu-
sion may apply to ICFs and SNFs.
3. Improper Guidelines
A third, alternative argument against the IMD exclusion is that the
HHS internal interpretive IMD guidelines, used to determine
whether a facility should be classified as an IMD, are excessively
broad. Consequently, the guidelines should be changed so that facil-
ities are classified as IMDs only if they provide a specialized degree
of mental health services. While this argument recognizes that such
a revision may still bar some Nursing Facility (NF) residents from
receiving Medicaid, these changes would reduce the number of facili-
ties that fall within the IMD exclusion.
The current guidelines consist of ten criteria137 to determine
whether a facility should be declared an IMD. Auditors use these
guidelines to determine whether the "overall character" of a facility
is "established and maintained primarily for the care and treatment
of individuals with mental diseases."' 38 While it has been deter-
mined that the satisfaction of a single criterion is not enough to de-
monthly comfort benefit to a certain number" of mentally ill persons. But, the stat-
ute also imposed "equivalent deprivation on other groups who are not mentally ill,
while at the same time benefitting substantial numbers of the mentally ill." Id.
135. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance v. Heckler, 731 F.2d 1052, 1060
(2d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 524 (1985).
136. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524, 537
(1985). The Court went on to say that the state had not, however, "established that
Congress ha[d] only excluded 'hospitals' in which a mental illness [was] treated in-
stead of 'institutions for mental diseases.' " Id. at 537-38.
137. See supra notes 42 and 130 (current Minnesota Department of Human Serv-
ices and HHS guidelines).
138. 42 C.F.R. § 435.1009 (1989) (defining an institution for mental diseases).
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clare a facility an IMD, 139 neither the HHS nor the courts have
specified how many of the criteria are required.
An audit team review guide was prepared by the Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration in April 1987 to advise auditors how to col-
lect data to meet the "overall character" test.' 40 To ensure that the
overall character test is met, this review guide instructs auditors that
"[i]t is essential that you evaluate the applicability of each criterion
for each facility reviewed. You must support as many of these criteria as
possible with as much supporting documentation as possible." 141
The ten IMD guidelines can be split into two main categories: one
that focuses on the profile of the resident population within a facility,
and one that focuses on the type of services provided within a facil-
ity.t42 The category of guidelines that focuses on the profile of the
patient population within a facility has received the most scrutiny.
Guideline number eight focuses on a "preponderance of mental ill-
ness in the diagnoses of the patients in the facility,"143 guideline
number four focuses on the "proportion of the patients [that] are
receiving psychopharmacological drugs,"144 and guideline number
139. Granville House, Inc. v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 715 F.2d
1292 (8th Cir. 1983). The circuit court held that satisfaction of one criterion would
not necessarily be enough to declare a facility an IMD and remanded the case to the
district court. Id. at 1304.
140. See TrrLE XIX FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 42. The
agency set out in the introduction that the
guide is designed to provide specific instructions on performing a financial
management review of facilities which may be institutions for mental dis-
eases (IMDs). As such, this guide reflects current law, legislations, policy,
Grant Appeals Board (GAB) decisions, and various court decisions on this
subject as referenced in Section II. The methods and procedures detailed in
this guide are a compilation of those that have been successfully employed
in the past in various regional office financial management reviews and Of-
fice of the Inspector General Audit Agency audits of IMDs.
Id. at 1.
141. Id. at 8 (emphasis in original). The purpose behind the supporting documen-
tation requirement is that no one criterion is sufficient by itself to classify an institu-
tion. Consistent with this idea, recent decisions have evaluated IMD determinations
on the basis of the variety and sufficiency of the evidence presented to support the
determination. Id. at 7-8; see also supra note 139 and accompanying text.
In general, the methodologies used to support certain criteria have been and
likely will continue to be closely scrutinized by the states. TrrLE XIX FINANCIAL MAN-
AGEMENT REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 42, at 8.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 11. The eighth guideline requires that an auditor carefully review the
appropriate Independent Professional Review reports to determine if there is an in-
dication of a preponderance of mentally ill patients in the facility under review. If
this criterion is carefully and adequately supported, it may carry great weight by pro-
viding an unbiased corroboration of patient statistics. Id.; see also REVIEW OF NURSING
FACILITIES, supra note 42, at 8 (guideline number eight) and note 130 (guideline
number ten).
144. TITLE XIX FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 42, at 12. The
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six focuses on whether "more than 50% of all the patients in the
facility have mental diseases which require inpatient treatment ac-
cording to the patients' medical records" (commonly known as the
51% rule).145
While the Supreme Court has never directly analyzed any of these
criteria, the 51 % rule was under close scrutiny in Minnesota v. Heck-
ler. 146 The court in Minnesota v. Heckler held that the "cardinal gauge
by which to distinguish IMDs and ICFs must be the degree of care
and treatment required by the mental or physical conditions of pa-
tients residing at any given facility," as opposed to the "mere pres-
ence" of mentally ill patients. 147
The court in Minnesota v. Heckler found the 51 7 rule to be in direct
conflict with the statutory definition of an ICF.148 The court stated
that the statute "expressly authorizes care of patients in an ICF with
diagnoses of either 'mental or physical condition[s]' as long as the
illnesses involved 'require' a lesser 'degree of care and treatment'
than a hospital or SNF provides." 149 Therefore, the 51% rule con-
flicted with the ICF definition that authorized care for patients with
mental conditions.
Additionally, the 51% rule conflicts with the Supreme Court's
holding in Schweiker. The Court in Schweiker upheld the constitution-
ality of the IMD exclusion by relying on the premise that the IMD
exclusion does not directly target individuals with mental illness, but
focuses on the type of institution providing the care.' 50
The obvious problem with these guidelines is that they "seek out"
mentally ill individuals who have already met a facility's admission
requirements. These guidelines show that the IMD exclusion applies
directly to mentally ill individuals. If, as these guidelines indicate,
the IMD exclusion hinges on the mere presence of large numbers of
mentally ill individuals, then the IMD exclusion does, in fact, dis-
criminate directly against the class of the mentally ill.
Another problem with the 51 % rule is that the rule does not re-
fourth guideline requires the auditor to evaluate the patient's treatment process in
order to determine if that treatment is focused on a mental or physical illness and
thus, in turn, establish whether a facility provides psychiatric/psychological treat-
ment. Id.; see also REVIEW OF NURSING FACIrITES, supra note 42, at 7 (guideline
number four).
145. TITLE XIX FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 42, at 14. In
applying the sixth guideline, the reviewers must determine whether the patient's cur-
rent need for institutionalization results from a mental disease. Id.; see also REVIEW OF
NURSING FACILITIES, supra note 42, at 8 (guideline number six).
146. 718 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1982).
147. Id. at 866.
148. Id. at 862.
149. Id. at 863.
150. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 231 (1981).
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quire a patient to have a primary diagnosis of mental illness to be
included in the fifty-one percent.' 5 ' The rule only requires a secon-
dary diagnosis or a history of mental illness in any patient. This
means that patients admitted for physical problems will be counted
toward the fifty-one percent if they have either a prior history of
mental illness or a secondary diagnosis of mental illness.152
A change in the HHS internal interpretive guidelines to eliminate
the criteria that focus on the presence of mentally ill within long-
term care facilities would accomplish three things. First, such a
change would extinguish the valid argument, that was presented by
the Eighth Circuit in Minnesota v. Heckler and ignored by the Supreme
Court, that the IMD exclusion cuts across the statutory definitions of
the ICF and SNF classifications (now NF). Second, this change
would reduce the number of facilities that are classified as IMDs, and
finally, it would reduce the impact of the IMD exclusion on the class
of mentally ill.
But even if the guidelines were changed to eliminate the criteria
that focus on the presence of mentally ill individuals, the remaining
criteria that focus on the type of services provided would continue to
reduce the quality of life for all residents who live in NFs.153 For
example, guideline number four that focuses on whether a facility's
"staff has specialized psychiatric/psychological training"54 and
whether "a large portion of the patients are receiving psycho-
pharmacological drugs,"' 55 flies in the face of the statutory require-
ment that NFs "provide services and activities to attain or maintain
the highest practicable physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being
of each resident ...."156
If facilities are so penalized for hiring staff with such training, or
for administering the proper psychopharmacological drugs, the obvi-
ous effect will be to discourage facilities from providing these serv-
ices. In discontinuing mental health services and appropriate drug
treatment to avoid the IMD exclusion, the quality of life of all NF
residents will necessarily be diminished.
151. Id. See also REVIEW OF NURSING FACILITIES supra note 42, at 8 (guideline
number six).
152. Minnesota v. Heckler, 718 F.2d at 863.
153. Nursing Facilities are required by statute to "care for ... residents in such a
manner and in such an environment as will promote maintenance or enhancement of
the quality of life of each resident." 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b)(l)(A) (1988).
154. See REVIEW OF NURSING FACILITIES, supra note 42, at 7 (guideline number
four).
155. Id.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b)(2) (1988) (requirements relating to "quality of life"
which NFs must promote).
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III. THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA
In response to the current federal IMD policies, the Minnesota De-
partment of Human Services has set out recommendations for IMD
facilities.157 These recommendations, intended to "alleviate the ad-
verse financial and service ramifications of the federal government's
IMD policies,' 158 directly affect alternatives for individuals with
mental illness with respect to placement and services.
Many of the state's recommendations encourage facilities to
change the characteristics and/or resident populations of the facility
to avoid the IMD classification.159 These recommendations, to-
gether with the uncertainty of state funds, provide a great incentive
for private facilities to make the changes necessary to avoid the IMD
classification, and ensure payment under Medicaid. As facilities work
to avoid the IMD classification, there will be fewer alternatives for
the mentally ill.160
IV. PROPOSAL
The IMD exclusion within the Medicaid Program is currently
under review by the United States Health Care Financing Adminis-
tration (HCFA). This review, mandated by Congress, requires the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to conduct a study of the
IMD exclusion, and to release that study to Congress on October 1,
1990.16 The report has been delayed, however, and is not expected
157. These recommendations include the following:
- Require all NF/IMDs to maintain current diagnostic assessments on file
for all residents.
- Encourage downsizing to non-IMD status where feasible [16 beds or
less].
- Encourage movement toward serving a more physically disabled population where
feasible.
- Provide continuing information to facilities and counties on the types of
individuals who can and cannot be served in NF/IMDs and on the resources avail-
able to assist facilities in meeting resident needs.
- Re-evaluate the IMD status of the NF/IMDs at logical points and "un-
declare" facilities as IMDs if appropriate.
- Revise the state's NF level-of-care criteria to further prevent admission or
retention of individuals who have primary MI [Mental Illness] disabilities.
- Advocate at the federal level for changes in IMD policy.
REVIEW OF NURSING FACILrES, supra note 42, at 65-71 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at vii.
159. For recommendations from REVIEW OF NURSING FACILrIES, see supra note
157.
160. Minnesota county representatives have observed that few service alternatives
exist for mentally ill residents at this time. See REVIEW OF NURSING FACILMEs, supra
note 42, at 58.
If the current IMDs are able to avoid the classification in the future, there will be
a much higher demand for other types of community living arrangements and psychi-
atric hospitals/facilities not certified under the Medicaid Program (state funded).
161. Congress provided the following:
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to be completed until much later, in spring of 1991.162 Given the
longstanding congressional support of the IMD exclusion, and the
additional costs the federal government would incur if the IMD ex-
clusion were repealed, the conclusions of the study are likely to sup-
port continued retention of the IMD exclusion.163
To counter these unfavorable conclusions, strong arguments must
be made to Congress for the elimination or modification of the IMD
exclusion. Legislation should be drafted in response to the study to
support the three alternative arguments stated previously in this
article:
(1) the IMD exclusion should be repealed;
(2) the Medicaid classifications should be mutually exclusive;
and,
(3) the IMD interpretive guidelines are improper and should be
changed to focus only on facilities that provide a specialized
level of mental health services.
The congressional mandate provides a unique opportunity to ar-
gue for the repeal or modification of the IMD exclusion. Such an
opportunity may not surface again. If the opportunity is allowed to
pass without the repeal or modification of the IMD exclusion, the
(a) INSTITUTIONS FOR MENTAL DISEASES.-
(1) STUDY.-The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall
conduct a study of-
(A) the implementation, under current provisions, regula-
tions, guidelines, and regulatory practices . . . of the exclusion of
coverage of services to certain individuals residing in institutions
for mental diseases, and
(B) the costs and benefits of providing services ... in public
subacute psychiatric facilities which provide services to psychiatric
patients who would otherwise require acute hospitalization.
(2) REPORT.-By not later than October 1, 1990, the Secretary
shall submit a report to Congress on the study and shall include in the
report recommendations respecting-
(A) modifications in such provisions, regulations, guidelines,
and practices, if any, that may be appropriate to accommodate
changes that may have occurred since 1972 in the delivery of psy-
chiatric and other mental health services on an inpatient basis to
such individuals, and
(B) the continued coverage of services provided in subacute
psychiatric facilities under title XIX of the Social Security Act.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6408, 103 Star.
2106, 2267 (1989).
162. Telephone interview with Jeff Buck, Analyst in the Office of Research and
Demonstrations, Health Care Financing Agency (Nov. 4, 1990). The report on IMDs
was not completed by the October 1, 1990, date mandated by Congress. HCFA is
currently working on the report, and expects the report to be completed by early- to
mid-1991. Because the IMD exclusion has been in the Medicaid provisions since
1965, and because repeal of the exclusion would cost the federal government billions
of dollars, the study is not likely to recommend repeal of the IMD exclusion. Id.; see
also supra note 161 (statute mandating report).
163. See supra note 162.
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IMD issues may be buried with little chance of being repealed in the
future.
CONCLUSION
If the IMD exclusion is not repealed, each state will be prompted
to propose or adopt plans to address or avoid the financial burden of
caring for the mentally ill that had been covered in NFs (previously
SNFs and ICFs) under the Medicaid Program. Thus, the mentally ill
will be subjected to inconsistent levels of treatment across the
United States.
The time has come for Congress to enact fair and responsible
changes to the Medicaid Program to ensure that the mentally ill re-
ceive the same quality of care and treatment throughout the country.
All disabled individuals, whether or not they have a history of mental
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